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PROPERTY TORTS BETWEEN SPOUSES AND USE
DURING MARRIAGE OF THE MATRIMONIAL
HOME OWNED BY THE OTHER.
WILLIAM E. McCu1DY t

A

MARRIED WOMAN'S property may have belonged to her at the
time of marriage or it may have come to her during marriage. It
may have been acquired from a source other than her husband or it
may have come from him, or he may have contributed to its purchase,
paid taxes, made improvements. The property may be real estate,
possibly used as the matrimonial home. It may be personalty, possibly
household furniture. The husband may be using the premises, or a
portion thereof, for professional office or business purposes. He may
be using chattels or have sold them. The wife does not wish to have
the property so used and objects. Marital difficulties as such may not
have arisen, or the parties may be estranged, or one may have left the
other with or without justification. Similar situations may arise in
respect to the wife's use of the husband's property. Are civil actions
available between husband and wife to protect or recover property or
to redress conduct in reference to it? Do legal concepts of ownership
and of conjugal rights and duties conflict? To what extent is subordination of one concept to the other or adjustment between them
required?
The question of protection and redress of property interests by
civil action between husband and wife did not exist at common law.
These problems began in a limited way with the equitable separate estate and have been made more general by married women's property
statutes.
t Professor of Law, Harvard University.

(447)
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I.
At common law-and it is still the law except as affected by the
doctrine of the married woman's separate estate in equity or as modified

or changed by legislation-marriage altered the legal position and
capacities of a woman in respect to property in ways not always consistent with each other. Real estate owned by her at the time of marriage continued hers in ownership,1 but her husband acquired by operation of law a right to the rents and profits during coverture u (jus
mariti) ' and a right to curtesy (an interest for his own life in his
wife's real estate of inheritance if he survived her and issue had been
born alive) ; ' her chattels personal passed to the husband by operation
of law; 5 her choses in action became subject to the husband's power to
reduce to possession, and if so reduced during coverture, the proceeds
became his exclusively.' A woman after marrying still had capacity
to acquire property, but the husband's rights therein accrued immediately upon acquisition to the same extent as in property owned by his
wife at the time of marriage. 7 He had the exclusive right to her
services and earnings, whatever the nature of the services and for
whomsoever performed.' If property was conveyed or transferred to
a trustee on an ordinary trust for a married woman, or for a woman
who later married, her husband acquired rights in her equitable interests
analogous to his rights in her legal interest; equity followed the law.'
1. Bishop v. Readsboro Chair Mfg. Co., 85 Vt. 141, 81 Ati. 454, 36 L.R.A. (n.s.)
1171, Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 1914 B. 1163 (1911) ; Robertson v. Norris, 11 Q.B.D. 916,
116 Eng. Rep. 716 (Q.B. 1848).
2. Clapp v. Stoughton, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 463 (1830).
3. See Hasking, The Estate by the Marital Right, 97 U. PA. L. R4v. 345 (1949).
4. Van Duzer v. Van Duzer, 6 Paige Ch. (N.Y.) 366, 31 Am. Dec. 257 (1837)

Mattocks v. Stearn, 9 Vt. 326 (1837).
5. Jordan v. Jordan, 52 Me. 320 (1864). For chattels real, see Doe dem.
Roberts v. Polgrean, I H. B1. 535, 126 Eng. Rep. 307 (C.P. 1791) ; Miles v. Williams,
1 P. Wms. 249, 258, 24 Eng. Rep. 375, 378 (Ch. 1714) ; Grute v. Locroft, 1 Cro. Eliz.
287, 78 Eng. Rep. 541 (K.B.).

6. Howard v. Bryan, 9 Gray (Mass.) 239 (1857)
26 Eng. Rep. 528 (Ch. 1741).

Bates v. Dandry, 2 Atk. 2G5,

7. Beale v. Knowles, 45 Me. 479 (1858) (real estate); Commonwealth v. Davis,
63 Mass. (9 Cush.) 283 (1852) (chattels) ; Wells v. Tyler, 25 N.H. 340 (1852) (legacy) ; Carne v. Brice, 7 M. & W. 183, 151 Eng. Rep. 731 (Ex. 1840).
8. Clapp v. Stoughton, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 463, 469 (1830); Buckley v. Collier, I Salk. 114, 91 Eng. Rep. 105 (K.B. 1692) ; Brashford v. Buckingham, Cro. Jac.
77, 79 Eng. Rep. 65 (K.B. 1605); Prat v. Taylor, Cro. Eliz. 61, 78 Eng. Rep. 322

(Q.B. 1587).

9. But see note 25 infra.
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A married woman had no legal capacity to convey, transfer, or
devise, 10 or to contract," or to sue or be sued alone.' 2 For permanent
injury to her freehold or to reduce to possession her choses in action,
the husband joined with his wife as party plaintiff '3 (similarly, he was
joined as party defendant on her antenuptial debts and for her own
thus indicating that the substantive right (or
tortious conduct)
obligation or liability) was hers. The proceeds of recovery were the
husband's. (Similarly, he was liable to satisfy a joint judgment.)
For injuries to his jus mariti or to recover rents and profits he sued in
his own name in his own right.'
A wife's only interest in the property of her husband was her dower
interest. With this exception, and with the further exception of transactions with his wife, marriage did not affect the husband's own general
property and contract capacity.

It followed therefore for reasons either substantive or procedural
or both that neither husband nor wife could have an action against the
other.' 6
It is apparent that the concept of unity of husband and wife, often
advanced as the basis of the common-law effects of marriage, explains
only a few of those effects and even then it is not likely the sole explanation. This concept appears, perhaps, in the estate or tenancy by the en10. Concord Bank v. Bellis, 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 276 (1872) (conveyance)
Lowell v. Daniels, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 161 (1854) ; Marston v. Norton, 5 N.H. 205
(1830) (will of real estate).
In England a method of conveying the wife's fee to real estate early developed.
fine and recovery. See Albany Fire Ins. Co. v. Bay, 4 N.Y. 9, 12 (1850). In the United
States the method that developed was a deed executed by husband and wife as joint
grantors. See Manchester v. Hough, 16 Fed. Cas. 572 No. 9,005 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827),
which refers to it as an example of communis error facit ius but a practice born of
necessity.
11. Loyd v. Lee, 1 Strange 94, 93 Eng. Rep. 406 (K.B. 1795) ; Gregory v. Pierce,
45 Mass. (4 Met.) 478 (1842) (capacity where husband exiled or has abjured the
realm).
12. Bishop v. Readsboro Chair Mfg. Co., 85 Vt. 141, 81 Atl. 454, 36 L.R.A.
(n.s.) 1171, 1914 B. Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 1163 (1911).
13. Bishop v. Readsboro Chair Mfg. Co. supra note 12.
14. Hawk v. Harmon, 5 Binney 42 (Pa. 1812) (torts); Cole v. Shurtleff, 41
Vt. 311 (1868) (debt) ; Heard v. Stamford, 3 P. Wins. 409, 24 Eng. Rep. 1123 (Ch.
1735) (debt).
15. Clapp v. Stoughton, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 463 (1830); Bishop v. Readsboro
Chair Mfg. Co., 85 Vt. 141, 81 Atl. 454 (1911).
16. See McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 H.Av. L.
Rxv. 1030 (1930).
Cohabitational duties were cognizable however in the ecclesiastical.courts by suits
for limited divorce from bed and board (mensa2 et thoro) in cases of adultery or
cruelty, and by the bill for restitution of conjugal rights originally designed to compel a resumption of cohabitation where a spouse unjustifiably refused to live with the
other. See McCurdy, Divorce-A Suggested Approach with ParticularReference to
Dissolution for Living Separate and Apart, 9 VAND. L. REv. 685 (1956).
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tirety,"' and in the incapacity of husband and wife to contract inter se 18
and to convey and transfer property directly one to the other "o(identity
is also the explanation often given for the incapacity of either to sue
the other)'. Indeed, the effect of marriage upon property was mostly
inconsistent with the unity concept, and is referable rather to an attempt
to reconcile a general attitude toward preservation of ownership and
inheritance-particularly of real property-with an attitude that regarded a wife as subordinate to and merged in her husband.20 The
21
concept of unity or legal identity was used only when convenient.
II.
By the beginning of the eighteenth century the legal position of
a husband in respect to his wife's property and his uncontrolled use of
his rights and powers therein were becoming increasingly intolerable to
persons of large properties who desired to convey, devise or bequeath
interests therein to, or settle them upon, daughters or other female
relatives. For some time the unity concept had not been regarded in
equity in the same way as at law. 22 Since the trust device alone would
not fully accomplish restrictive purposes, eventually a bold attempt was
made by settlors to achieve such purposes by inserting in the trust
instrument a provision that the res should be held to the sole and
separate use of the woman notwithstanding marriage and free from
use and control by the husband. -Courts of equity thereupon began to
give effect to such provision, and to protect the wife in such estate
against the husband as well as against his creditors in matters both of
ownership and of use and control.'
And so the anomalous doctrine of
17. Husband and wife could acquire real estate as tenants by the entirety (the

husband having the right to rents and profits during marriage, the survivor having the

full ownership upon the death of the other). This holding was a specie of joint tenancy
but differed from it basically in theory and effect. Hoag v. Hoag, 213 Mass. 50, 99
N.E. 521 (1912) ; Hardenbergh v. Hardenbergh, 10 N.J.L. 42, 18 Am. Dec. 371 (Sup.

Ct. 1828).
18. Bassett v. Bassett, 112 Mass. 99, 100 (1873).
19. Firebrass dem. Symes v. Pennant, 2 Wils. 254, 95 Eng. Rep. 46 (Ch. 1734).
A conveyance by one spouse to the other required a conveyance by the one to a third
person and a conveyance back to the other. Jewell v. Porter, 31 N.H. 34 (1855).
20. See I BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, * 433, 435, 436.
That there was not true legal unity of person is reflected from the familiar and
facetious saying that at common law husband and wife were one and the husband was
that one.
21. Burdeno v. Amperse, 14 Mich. 91 (1866). See also 0. Kahn-Freund, Inconsistencies and Injustices in the Law of Husband and Wife, 15 MODERN L. REv. 133
(1952), 16 MODERN L. REv. 34, 16 MODERN L. REv. 148 (1953).
Also, in the criminal law the unity concept was not consistently applied. See
MCCURDY, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 553, 759-760 (4th ed. 1952).
22. Sankey v. Golding, Cary 87, 21 Eng. Rep. 46 (Ch. 1579).
23. See Picquet v. Swan, 19 Fed. Cas. 600, No. 11131 (C.C.D. Mass. 1827)
Slanning v. Style, 3 P. Wins. 334, 24 Eng. Rep. 1089 (Ch. 1734).
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a married woman's separate estate in equity developed. Later the
utilization of a third-person trustee frequently was omitted by a transferor or settlor, and property was transferred to or settled directly upon
a woman for her sole and separate use.24 In such cases equity regarded
the husband as trustee of the particular interest he acquired, subject to
the same restrictions as would apply if a third-person trustee had been
employed.'
In equity the married woman in respect to her separate
estate was a feme sole having power of disposition,26 of contracting in
reference to it,2" of acquisition directly from her husband,2" and to sue
and be sued,2" including suits between herself and her husband."0 To
prevent the wife's voluntary disposition to the husband (often easy for
him to induce) equity developed the further anomalous device of restraints both as to income (anticipation) and corpus (alienation)."
It has been said that the doctrine of the separate estate was conceived by the property class and given effect by courts of equity to
protect heirs and next of kin of a married woman (and incidentally the
woman herself) ; 32 and that it did not rest on a concept of equality between husband and wife in either personal or property matters, much
a
less on a concept of equality of the sexes.'
24. Bennet v. Davis, 2 P. Wms. 316, 24 Eng. Rep. 746 (Ch. 1725).
25. Picquet v. Swan, 19 Fed. Cas. 600, No. 11131 (C.C.D. Mass. 1827) ; see Milbourn v. Ewart, 5 T.R. 381, 101 Eng. Rep. 213 (K.B. 1793) (prevents extinguishment of executory provisions of antenuptial settlement).
At a later period equity developed the doctrine of a wife's equity to a settlement
to require the setting aside for her maintenance of a portion of her equitable choses
subject to her husband's reduction to possession or so reduced by him. Elibank v.
Montolieu, 5 Ves. Jun. 137, 31 Eng. Rep. 832 (Ch. 1801) ; Howard v. Moffatt, 2 Johns.
R. 206, 207 (N.Y. Ch. 1816). This equity applied when the husband was not properly supporting his wife.
26. In England this jus disponendi was derived from ownership in equity. Taylor
v. Meads, 4 DeG.J. & S. 597, 48 Eng. Rep. 1050 (R.C. 1865). There is considerable
authority in the United States that treats it as a power derived from the terms of the
settlement. Albany Fire Ins. Co. v. Bay, 4 N.Y. 9, 27 (1850).
27. In the United States this derives from express or implied charge. In England
the reason is contractual capacity in equity. See Yale v. Dederer, 22 N.Y. 450, 78
Am. Dec. 216 (1860). But the contract does not bind the married woman personallyonly separate property owned at the time the contract was made. Ex parte Jones, 12
Ch. D. 484, 489 (C.A. 1879).
28. Shepard v. Shepard, 7 Johns. R. 57 (N.Y. Ch.), 11 Am. Dec. 396 (1823).
29. Sankey v. Golding, Cary 87, 21 Eng. Rep. 46 (Ch. 1579).
30. Cannel v. Buckle, 2 P. Wms. 243, 244, 24 Eng. Rep. 715, 716 (Ch. 1724).
31. Jackson v. Hobhouse, 2 Mer. 483, 487, 35 Eng. Rep. 1025, 1026-1027 (Ch.
1817). It has been characterized as an anomaly on an anomaly, particularly in jurisdictions rejecting the spendthrift trust. Expressly continued by earlier Married Women's Property statutes it has more recently been abolished in England. See Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act, 1935, 25 & 26 GEo. 5, c. 30, s. 2 and
Married Women (Restraint upon Anticipation) Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 GEo. 6, c. 78.
See Rappeport, The Equitable Separate Estate and Restraints on Anticipation: Its
Modern Significance, 11 MIAMI L.Q. 85 (1956).
32. See 0. Kahn-Freund, Inconsistencies and Injustices in the Law of Husband
and Wife, 15 MODERN L. Rxv. 133 (1952), 16 MODERN L. Rtv. 34, 16 MODERN L. REv.
148 (1953) citing DIcEy, LAW AND OPINION IN ENGLAND, Lecture XI (1914).
33. See 0. Kahn-Freund, supra note 32.
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The equity doctrine of the separate estate, however much a change
it effected in the position of a husband in respect to his wife's property,
had numerous inherent shortcomings. Her rights existed and were
enforceable only in equity. The husband had a power to convey to
a bona fide purchaser for value whatever legal interest he acquired and
thus defeat the equity to that extent. The doctrine had no general
application to services and earnings (although the husband could voluntarily make their proceeds his wife's separate property) 3 4-a matter
of little practical importance until much later. But perhaps the doctrine's greatest shortcoming was that it did not apply to property simply
owned by a woman at the time of marriage or acquired by her during
coverture. It was necessary that it come to her designated for her
sole and separate use free of her husband's use and control. The utility
of the device was therefore restricted in practice to persons of large or
considerable fortune who were accustomed to employing solicitors.
During the first half of the nineteenth century this shortcoming was increasingly regarded as irksome and discriminatory.
A few cases concerning rights of the spouses in respect to the
wife's equitable separate estate which was in fact used as the matrimonial home are to be found in the English chancery reports.
In Wood v. Wood " the separate estate consisting of hotel premises and business used in part as the matrimonial home had been settled
on the wife by the husband so that she might conduct the business in
the same manner as if a feme sole. Absent for six months, the husband
returned and acted as full owner to the embarrassment of the wife's
business. An injunction was granted excluding him from the premises
and from interfering with the business, the court emphasizing the
''contract."
In Green v. Green " which Wood v. Wood had followed, it appeared that the parties were living separate and apart because of the
alleged improper conduct of the husband. An injunction was granted
to the wife against her husband's use and occupation of the home which
was her separate estate, despite the argument that the injunction would
operate as a divorce mensa et thoro. The Vice Chancellor expressed
the opinion that if the injunction had that effect, a question which he
could not determine, the husband would not be without his remedy in
the ecclesiastical courts. The reference is perhaps to the bill for
restitution of conjugal rights.
34. Slanning v. Style, 3 P. Wins. 334, 24 Eng. Rep. 1089 (Ch. 1734).

35. 19 W.R. 1049 (Ch.1871).
36. 5 Hare 399, n., 67 Eng. Rep. 967 (V.C. 1840).
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In Symonds v. Hallett,17 while a suit by the wife for divorce was
pending the husband was insisting on using the wife's separate real
estate (which they had occupied as a home) but not for the purpose
of consortium. An interlocutory injunction granted the wife was upheld. But Cotton, L. J., commented that on final determination "
it will have to be seriously considered whether the separate use, which
is the creation of Court of Equity, entitles a wife to exclude her husband from the place where she is residing, and from coming there to
exercise the rights he has as a husband. . .
To say that she is a
feme sole is mere hypothesis and an imagination, because she has a
husband, though as regards property she is to be considered as a feme
sole. Expressions have been used that she is entitled to be there in all
respects as a feme sole and to be protected against her husband's acts
as if he were a stranger. That is very true as regards the property. But
is the husband to be considered a stranger because the property is
vested in her for her separate use? . . . My view is this, that the
separate use was not created by a Court of Equity in any way to enable
a wife to prevent the husband from exercising his rights and duties as
an husband except by preserving property for her." Brett, M. R., concurred for the reason that the husband was proposing to go to the
house not for the puropse of associating or living with his wife as a
husband, but for the purpose of using the house as a house for himself,
and expressed no opinion on the rest. Bowen, L. J., agreed for the
reason that the husband "complains of not being allowed the proprietary
use," and also preferred to express no opinion on the other point.
Without repudiation of consortium it would seem that the permissive use by the husband could be revoked by the wife.8" The judges'
doubt concerning a final decree may be explainable, not on the ground
that the conjugal right of consortium creates a right in property or its
use but rather, for the reason that a court of equity has a discretion in
the recognition of or protection it will afford the separate estate. Such
an estate may not be construed to mean the exclusion of consortium or
created for that purpose. Or the estate being itself an anomalous
creation of equity, relief may the more easily be denied for an attitude
regarded as inequitable on the part of the person seeking equity. It
is for this reason that marital questions as distinguished from property
may be considered. Judicial discretion where equitable relief is not
sought or when ownership has become the subject of statute is not
necessarily the same.
37. 24 Ch. D. 346 (C.A. 1883).
38. Cf. Jaques v. Methodist Episcopal Church, 17 Johns. R. 548, 593 (N.Y. Ch.
1820) where the voluntary use by a wife of her separate estate for her own support
was said to be "revocable at her pleasurf "

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1957

7

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 4 [1957], Art. 1

[VOL. 2: p. 447

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

III.

The first English Married Women's Property Act that was to
some extent general in scope was enacted in 1870.9 It provided that
personal property coming to a married woman by intestacy and any
sum of *money not exceeding £200 under any deed or will (subject to
their provisions) "shall belong to the woman for her separate use,"
that rents and profits of freehold, copyhold, or custom-hold property
coming to a married woman by intestacy "shall belong to such woman
for her separate use" subject to trust settlements (sections 1 through
8) ; and that earnings of a woman (married after the effective date of
the Act) from employment sources apart from the husband "shall be
deemed held and settled to her separate use." 40
That this statute was modelled upon, and a modification of, the
doctrine of equitable separate estate is shown not only by its terminology
but also by its omissions. Devised real estate and specific bequests
are not included probably because such devises or bequests would carry
separate estate provisions if the testator so intended, and chattels personal and real property coming to a married woman other than by death
are not included. But in respect to property acquisitions which are
included a formal settlement for separate use is no longer necessary.
The equity model is further apparent from the provisions for
property protection and redress. By section 9 it was provided that "In
any question between husband and wife as to property declared by this
Act to be the separate property of the wife, either party may apply by
summons or motion in a summary way, either to the Court of Chancery
. or .

.

.

the judge of the County Court .

.

.

and thereupon

the judge may make such order . . . as he shall think fit .
provided that any order made . . . shall be subject to appeal [in the
same manner as in equity]."

It was then provided by section 11 that "A married woman may
maintain an action in her own name for the recovery of any wages,
earnings, money, and property by this Act declared to be her separate
property, or of any property belonging to her before marriage, and
which her husband shall, by writing under his hand, have agreed with
her shall belong to her after marriage as her separate property, and
she shall have in her own name the same remedies, both civil and
criminal, against all persons whomsoever for the protection and security
39. 33 & 34 VICT. c. 93 (1870).
The Act of 1874, 37 & 38 VicT. c. 50 amended the provisions of the Act of 1870,
supra, that dealt with the husband's liability for his wife's antenuptial debts.
40. Also in the case of any married woman, certain annuities, deposits in savings
banks, bank stocks, corporation and building and loan securities "shall be deemed her
separate property."
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. as if such .

.

.

property belonged to her as an un-

married woman.
The Married Women's Property Act of 1882 41 was more com-

prehensive in scope and broader in treatment. By its provisions a
woman married after the commencement of the Act continues to hold
as her separate property all property real or personal belonging to her
at the time of marriage and all such property acquired or devolving
upon her during marriage (including wages or earnings from sources
other than the husband), and every married woman was given the
same rights as to property accruing after the commencement of the Act
"as if she were a feme sole" (and powers of disposition inter vivos or
by will).
Section 12 provided that every married woman "shall have in her
own name against all persons whomsoever, including her husband, the
same civil remedies and also (subject, as regards her husband, to the
proviso hereinafter contained) the same remedies and redress by way
of criminal proceedings, for the protection and security of her own
separate property, as if such property belonged to her as a feme sole, but,
except as aforesaid, no husband or wife shall be entitled to sue the other
for a tort.

" 42

And section 17 provided that "In any question between husband
and wife as to the title to or possession of property, either party
may apply by summons or otherwise in a summary way to any judge
of the High Court of Justice . . . or . . . to the judge of the
county court . . . and the judge . . . may make such order with
respect to the property in dispute .
. or may direct such application
to stand over from time to time . . . in such manner as he shall
think fit..
,,4

In Lamer v. Lamer 44 it was held that an action will lie by a wife
against her husband for return of her personal property detained by
41. 45 & 46 VIcT. c. 75 (1882).
42. The proviso related to criminal proceedings: "...
no criminal proceeding
shall be taken by any wife against her husband by virtue of this Act while they are
living together, as to or concerning any property claimed by her; nor while they are
living apart, as to or concerning any act done by the husband while they were living
together, concerning property claimed by the wife, unless such property shall have
been wrongfully taken by the husband when leaving or deserting, or about to leave
or desert, his wife."
Section 16 has a similar prohibition against criminal proceedings by a husband
against his wife, but it is not in the form of a proviso.
43. The subsequent Married Women's Property Act, 1893, 56 & 57 VICT. c. 63 and
the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act, 1935, 25 & 26 Go. 5, c. 30
do not affect the problems discussed in this paper. The Act of 1893 deals with contracts and wills. The Act of 1935 abolishes the husband's liability for his wife's antenuptial contracts and torts and her postnuptial torts, which the Act of 1882 had limited (section 14).
44. [1905] 2 K.B. 539.
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him, and that section 17 does not limit section 12. Lord Alverstone,
C. J., observed that an action would clearly lie for damaging the wife's
property, and if so why not for detaining it; that section 17, being an
amendment of section 9 of the Act of 1870, and section 12 being new,
section 17 is not sufficiently strong to take away the right of action conferred by section 12. Phillimore, J., said that at first he was inclined
to think that "

.

. Section 12 being the enabling section, Section

17 had the effect of limiting the scope of Section 12; but I have come
to the conclusion that this is not the right view," and concluded that
section 12 is wide enough to include actions for recovery of all kinds.
of personal property. "I say nothing as to an action for the recovery of
real property." Jelf, J., took a much more decided view: section 17 is
simply an enabling section, and its "limited permissive right can [not]
in any way cut down or restrict the meaning and effect of Section
12."
In Shipman v. Shipman " a wife alleged that conduct (cruelty) of
her husband was such that the family could not live together and unless
he were restrained from entering her house or otherwise interfering
with her possession the value of the house would be seriously diminished
and she would be obliged to sell it. It was held that the wife could
have an interim injunction under section 12 although her house was
used as the matrimonial home. Pollack, M. R., after observing that
section 12 is in wide terms, and then referring to the earlier cases involving equitable separate estates,4" quoted from Symonds v. Hallett,4
and continued

"

while protecting the property of a wife as a

proper subject of protection, we must also regard the duties of spouses
to each other. There is, however, in my opinion, evidence here of conduct by the husband which would justify the wife in resisting a suit
for restitution of conjugal rights." Atkins, L. J., expressed his view
that "Section 12 is very clear . . . I think there is no evidence that
the value of the house would be materially diminished. . . . The
rights given to a wife are much wider . . . and the question is

whether she has those rights'in respect to the matrimonial home against
her husband.

That is a matter of public importance.

.

.

.

and if a

wife, without good cause, seeks to exclude her husband from the matrimonial home, she seeks to get the Court to enable her to evade a duty.
So perhaps, in normal circumstances .

.

.

I think the wife

45. [1924] 2 Ch. 140 (C.A.).
46. Green v. Green, 5 Hare 399, n., 67 Eng. Rep. 967 (V.C. 1840) ; Wood v. Wood,

19 W.R. 1049 (Ch. 1871); Weldon v. De Bathe, 14 Q.B.D. 339 (C.A. 1884). In that

case the court queried whether the husband had a right to enter the home owned by

the wife against her will when she is "in sole occupation."
47. 24 Ch. D. 346 (C.A. 1883).
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would have no claim. But such a right of the husband would be limited to being on the premises to enjoy the matrimonial consortium";
matrimonial misconduct of the husband would forfeit this; but, "In no
circumstances would he have the right to interfere with the rights of the
wife in a way detrimental to her separate property." In the view of
Sargent, L. J., " . .. The remedy invoked here is a special remedy
and a discretionary remedy, and I doubt whether the Court should grant
an injunction if it were sought from mere caprice on the part of the
wife." And Atkin, L. J., observed, "It is a remarkable thing that if a
wife has, under the Act of 1882, the right which is claimed here [section 12], there is no correlative right given to the husband." 48 No
reference is made to section 17 by any of the judges.
It seems clear that section 12 does not afford or allow the husband
a tort action against his wife, and as a matter of statutory construction
it may be doubted as an original question that section 17 was designed
to apply to property owned by the husband. It is not without significance that the statute is a married women's property act. Sections 1
through 9 deal comprehensively with her own property and necessarily
abolish or affect the husband's interests therein which he previously
would have had. But the only express reference to the husband's own
property is in section 10 (use of his monies by his wife to invest without
his consent, the section also referring forward to section 17; and that
section in turn referring back to section 10). It would seem that section 17 (with this exception) is dealing with controversies concerning
the woman's property or that claimed to be hers that fall within sections
1 through 9 and is designed to give more expeditious protection than
section 12. Moreover section 16 which prohibits criminal proceedings
by husband against wife to the same extent as the proviso to section
12 not only precedes section 17 but also is not a proviso in terms to
that section. The conclusion would seem to be that section 17 does
not create rights or recognize interests in a woman in property admittedly that of the husband, or restrict him in respect thereto. "Either
party . . . may apply" can be read to mean "apply in respect to matters coming, or claimed to be, within sections 1 through 9" and not to
mean (except as to section 10) that application may be made in respect
to the husband's property. Against this is the argument that section
9 of the Act of 1870 (a section similar to section 17) was expressly in
48. But this is not the only instance. A wife may maintain an action against her

husband for antenuptial personal injuries, Curtis v. Wilcox [1948] 2 K.B. 474 (C.A.) ;
but a husband has no such action against his wife, Baylis v. Blackwell, [1952] 1 All
E.R. 74 (K.B.D.). Cf. Edwards v. Porter, [1925] A.C. 1, 38 HARV. L. Rev. 1114, 20
ILL. L. RAv. 80, 34 YALE L.J. 543, 2 CAMB. L.J. 250, 29 L.N. 76, 41 L.Q. REv. 125

(1926).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1957

11

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 4 [1957], Art. 1

458

VILLANOVA

terms of "any question .

.

.

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL.

2: p. 447

as to property declared by this Act to be

the separate property of the wife," and that the Act of 1882, not so restricted in terms, is entitled "An Act . . . to amend.

.

"

How-

ever, for the reasons given above, this argument does not seem convincing.
In Bramwell v. Bramwell ' it appeared that a husband had deserted his wife, and that they had been living in a house which
he owned; also he had been paying her £1 a week under a court order
for £1 12s. a week which intimated that he need pay only £1 per week
as long as the wife lived in the house. In a proceeding by a husband
to recover possession, the county court had held that the wife was a
tenant and protected by the Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions
Act, 1939. An appeal was allowed on the ground that the wife was not
a tenant, and an order of possession should be made. Goddard, L. J.,
expressed the view that no action of ejectment could be brought since
it sounded in tort, the proper procedure being under section 17 of the
Act of 1882. This point, however, was not decided.5"
In Pargeterv. Pargeter "' in a somewhat similar situation it appeared that, matrimonial differences having arisen, husband and wife
were living apart, the husband having left his wife in the home with two
children after agreeing that she might remain there on condition that
she looked after the children, and allowing her a weekly sum. It was
held that the wife was not a tenant. The county courts had said that
the action was in effect one of trespass. The judges (on appeal) expressed some doubt about what was intended to be held in Bramwell v.
Bramwell since that was a case framed by way of an ordinary action
and not as an originating application, but agreed that the matter could
be raised by originating application under section 17.
In Hutchinson v. Hutchinson 52 the husband applied under section

17 for possession of a house owned by him and used as the matrimonial
home. It appeared that his wife had obtained a judicial separation.
It was held that the court had jurisdiction notwithstanding the separation, but that it would be unjust to make an order, reasoning that the
husband cannot sue for ejectment or trespass or any other tort, and
49. [1942] 1 K.B. 370 (C.A.), 58 L.Q. REv. 306. An earlier case involved an application by a husband against his wife under section 17 to recover his pearl studs.
The question related to which spouse owned them. An appeal was allowed because there

was no evidence that the studs were in the wife's possession. Wilder v. Wilder, 56
SOL. J. 571 (1912).
50. In Miller v. Miller [1940] Sess. Cas. 56, 52 Jurid. Rev. 171, a case unaffected
by the English Act of 1882, it appeared that relations between a husband and wife
having become strained she left him and sought his ejectment from the matrimonial
house which she owned. It was held that she could do so.
51. [1946] 1 All E.R. 570 (C.A.)
52. [1947] 2 All E.R. 792 (K.B.D.).
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that his only rights are under section 17, "which does not give him the
right he is now claiming, but leaves it open to the court to make such
order as it thinks fit. The Court has a discretion which, of course,
must be exercised judicially." Factors referred to were that the wife
had behaved properly, that she was in the house, and that it would be
unjust to turn her out.
Thereafter the doctrine seems to have crystallized that a deserted
wife (also semble one justifiably living apart from her husband) whom
the court would not order out of the house owned by the husband has
the position of a licensee with protection on equitable principles against
transferees or creditors of the husband.
In Lee v. Lee ' it was said: "I do not suggest that the judge
could have made an order transferring the title in the house to the wife,
but he certainly had jurisdiction to protect her in her occupation of it,
even to the extent of preventing the husband from disposing of it. The
order 1confirms and protects her special right as a deserted wife to stay
there-a right which has been repeatedly recognized in-this court."
In Bendall v. McWhirter " it was said:

" . .

.

Thus, the husband

can no longer turn her out of the matrimonial home. She has as much
right as he to stay there even though the house does stand in his name.
This has only been decided in the last ten years. It started in 1942
when Goddard, L. J., said that the husband's only way of getting his
wife out of the house was to make an application under s. 17 of the
Married Women's Property Act, 1882.

.

.

. and it is now settled law

that a deserted wife has a right, as against her husband, to stay in the
matrimonial home unless and until an order is made against her ...
One of the most obvious necessaries of a wife is a roof over her head,
and if we apply the old rule to modern conditions it seems only reasonable to hold that when the husband is the tenant of the matrimonial
home the wife should have an irrevocable authority to continue the
tenancy on his credit, and that when he is the owner of it she should
have an irrevocable authority to stay there..

.

Her possession is

not always exclusive. If the husband has only been guilty of desertion
and nothing else he is entitled to come back at any time asking to be
forgiven, and she is then bound to receive him. - She cannot then keep
him out of his house. But if he has, in addition to desertion, been
*guilty of cruelty or adultery, she is not bound to take him back. She
can keep him out of the house. Her possession may then be quite exclusive. But, whether her possession is exclusive or not, there can
53. [1952] 1 All E.R. 1299 (C.A.).
54. [1952] 1 All E.R. 1307 (C.A.).
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be no doubt that she is not a tenant of her husband. She has only a
personal privilege with no legal interest in the land, and she is, therefore, only a licensee.

.

.

.

Equity demands that the successor in

title [who is a purchaser or assignee with notice or without value]
should be in no better position than the husband." Also "she has no
legal or equitable interest in the home which she continues to occupy
and in that respect is in no better position than any other licensee. On
the other hand, her husband, the licensor, cannot bring proceedings
against her in ejectment, for the status of matrimony prevents it."
He, accordingly, cannot effectively revoke her license and in this respect the wife is in a more favourable position than that of an ordinary
licensee." "
In Westminster Bank v. Lee 17 it appeared that after the husband
had deserted his wife he executed a charge or equitable mortgage on
his house (matrimonial home) to a bank which was without notice of
the desertion. It was held that the bank could oust the wife, for
although her equity in the premises is more than a personal right against
the husband it is not an equitable estate enforceable against a subsequent
purchaser of an equitable estate for value and without notice.
The position of a husband under section 17 with respect to transferring or encumbering his own house may be thus stated: the wife is
subject to a mortgage or sale made before her husband's desertion; "
a purchaser without value or with notice of the desertion cannot oust
the wife,"9 but a purchaser without notice and for value can do so; 60
she has no right under section 17 to share in the proceeds of a sale,
unless the house was jointly owned; 8" and she has no right to remain
after divorce. 2
The equity of the wife which seems to stem from section 17 is not

an equity in the husband's property as such because of the marriage,
55. The reference is probably to section 12.

56. In Ferris v. Weaver, [1952] 2 All E.R. 233 (Q.B.D.), the court, referring
to an arrangement entered into between husband and wife, concluded ".

.

. that the

wife was a licensee with a contractual right to remain in this [the husband's] house
.... and,

"...

that the plaintiff bought the house with full notice of the details of

this arrangement . . . not because he wanted to buy it, but simply to enable the husband to defeat a right which the husband believed the wife possessed as a result of
the arrangement .... " and held against the plaintiff purchaser and for the defendant
wife.
57. [1956] 1 Ch. 7.
58. Lloyd's Bank Ltd. v. Oliver's Trustee [1953] 2 All E.R. 1443 (Ch. D) ; Barclay's Bank v. Bird [1954] 1 Ch. 274 (C.A.).
59. Street v. Denham [1954] 1 All E.R. 532 (Hampshire Assizes). See however
Woodcock & Sons v. Hobbs [1955] 1 All E.R. 455 (C.A.).
60. Tunstall v. Tunstall [1953] 2 All E.R. 310 (C.A.).
61. Cobb v. Cobb [1955] 2 All E.R. 696 (C.A.) held error to give her less than
one-half, there being no power to vary under section 17.
62. Vaughan v. Vaughan [1953] 1 All E.R. 209 (C.A.) ; cf. Fribance v. Fribance
[1955] 3 All E.R. 787 (Div.).
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but seems rather an "equity of desertion" 0" and this despite the fact that
there may have been no adjudication of the matter and no order made
under section 17 prior to the transfer of the premises to a purchaser.
Section 17 seems to be the vehicle for much litigation and to have been
productive of a new interest in a husband's real estate theretofore unknown."
Would the husband have a similar "equity" in respect to his wife's
house? Certainly some of the reasons given for the wife's "equity"
would not apply."'
IV.
Legislatures in the United States began enacting married women's
property statutes of more than special nature and scope 65 earlier than
Parliament had done in England; in several states prior to 1850.e6 A
steady progression of enactments occurred during the remainder of the
62a. See Stewart v. Stewart, [1948] 1 K.B. 507 (C.A.) where an order under
section 17 for possession against the wife of a flat of which the husband was tenant
was affirmed. Divorce proceedings by the husband for alleged adultery were pending.
63. "As the law stands today, husband and wife. face each other in matters of property like strangers.... Nothing is by law 'theirs,' everything is [in the absence of
express agreement] either 'his' or 'hers.' Sociologists must decide whether this legal
rule reflects the mores and ideas of the people. It is strongly suspected that it does
not." 0. Kahn-Freund, Inconsistencies and Injustices in the Law of Husband and
Wife, 15 MODERN L. Rnv. 133, 135 (1952). The author favors section 17, id. at 146.
For a general discussion of the English law see BARLOW, A CENTURY OF FAAILY LAW, 1857-1957, Chapter 9 Gifts and Transfers Intervivos and the Matrimonial
Home (1957) ; Cheshire, A New Equitable Interest in Land, 16 MOrgaN L. Rzv. 1
(1953) ; 0. Kahn-Freund, Inconsistencies and Injustices in the Law of Husband and

Wife, 15 MODERN L. Rzv. 133 (1952), 16 Modern L. Rev. 34, 16 Modern L. Rev. 148
(1953).
64. See Copeman v. Copeman, 103 L.J. 624 (1953) where it was held that the
husband was a licensee in the flat of which his wife was tenant, and that the wife
could revoke the license. After commenting that the question of ejecting the husband
related only to the particular flat the judge is reported to have said, "If the husband
provided a proper home elsewhere and genuinely asked the wife to join him and be
maintained by him she might well have no answer but to do so."
65. Prior to the passage of more comprehensive married women's property statutes, legislation dealing with specific common-law problems had been enacted in some
states, for example:

Feme sole trader acts where husbands shall go to sea leaving their wives to work
for their livelihood (Pennsylvania Act 1718, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, §§ 41, 61-63
(1930)).
Special acknowledgment statutes for separate examination of the wife made nec-

essary by the practice which had grown up of joinder of husband and wife to convey
the fee to the wife's real estate (South Carolina Act 1795, 5 Stat. 257; R.I. Laws
1798, sec. 7).
Restriction upon the jus mariti to require the husband to hold rents and profits
for the benefit of his family instead of himself individually (Henderson Grocery Co.
v. Johnson, 141 Tenn. 127, 207 S.W. 723 (1918) [before 1913]).
Restrictions of husband to the income of choses in action reduced to possession
(Turner v. Turner, 90 Conn. 676, 98 Atl. 324 (1916) [Act of 1849]).
Injunctive relief against the husband's squandering of his wife's property (Dillingham v. Dillingham, 9 Ohio App. 248 (1917) [Act of 1846]).
66. ME. LAWS c. 117 (1844); MAss. LAWS c. 208 (1845); N.H. LAWS c. 327
(1846) ; N.Y. LAWS c. 200 (1848).
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nineteenth century and continued into the present century, some states
Some of the
amending and extending their statutes several times."
earlier statutes, like the English Act of 1870, were confined to some
of the more striking shortcomings of the equitable separate estate doctrine. As time passed matters other than acquisition and use of property (and transactions and conduct directly related thereto) were
brought within statutory expansion: general capacity to contract, to
transfer and convey, to make wills both of personal and real property,
and to sue and be sued. The matter of services and earnings was variously dealt with.
It was recognized that even the more limited type earlier statutes
had made basic changes in the position of a married woman in respect
to property.
The New Hampshire law of 1846 68 was characterized 69 as effecting "modifications of well established doctrines of equity." The great
statutory change was said to make her position "legal" instead of "equitable." 70

A more comprehensive statute in 1861 in Illinois 7' had provided
that all property owned by a woman at the time of marriage and all
property acquired during coverture (from any person other than her
husband), shall be and remain her sole and separate property and be
held, owned, possessed and enjoyed by her the same as though unmarried, but made no provision for actions. The statute was held, in
Emerson v. Clayton,72 to enable the woman to maintain replevin, the
court saying, ".

.

.

Such a change in the relative rights and powers

of husband and wife, must, of necessity, give a different operation
to the rules of law by which they are to be governed..

By this

statute, a married woman must, since its enactment, be considered
a feme sole in regard to her estate.

.

.

.

the act [cannot] be effective

in the protection of her separate property, unless [her sole control
67. See Bryant v. Smith, 187 S.C. 453, 198 S.E. 20 (1938).

68. c. 327.
69. Batchelder v. Sargent, 47 N.H. 262 (1867). See also McCarty v. Skelton, 228
Ala. 531, 172 So. 901 (1937) ; Burdeno v. Amperse, 14 Mich. 91 (1866).
70. Under a Maine statute of 1844 (c.117, § 2), where no provision was made for
actions, it was held in Southard v. Plummer, 36 Me. 64 (1853) that a husband could

not maintain an action of trespass against a third person who had under authority of
the wife entered the house (which was hers) and carried away articles of her per-,
sonal property, the court reasoning "It is very evident . . . that her right of property
and control over it should remain, not only against the creditors and contracts of the
husband, but against the husband himself."
71. ILL. LAws p. 143 (1861).
72. 32 Ill. 493 (1863). See also Brandt v. Keller, 413 Ill. 503, 109 N.E.2d 729
(1953): ". . . the courts had construed the acts of 1861 and 1869 to permit a married woman to sue her husband . . . where it was necessary to protect her own property."
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over it] is made to extend to suits for its recovery even against her
husband. . ." 73
Married women's property statutes now exist in every state.
In addition to providing typically that property owned by a woman
at the time of marriage or acquired by her during marriage shall be
and remain hers in the same manner and to the same extent as though
she were unmarried,7 4 most of the statutes provide generally that
she may sue and be sued alone, or in her own name, or without joining
the husband; 7 in some states the provision being that she may sue
and be sued in respect to property. 76 Most of these statutes, however,
are silent on suits between husband and wife. In a few states express
provisions include or permit them.
In a few states such suits are
73. But cf. Cole v. Van Riper, 44 Ill. 58 (1867) where it was held that the married woman was given no power to convey her real estate without joinder of the husband: "The court put the case of a married woman living with her husband and children in a house owned by her together with the furnishing: literally she could forbid
the husband to enter and if he did he would be a trespasser liable to her in damages
('the wife could thus divorce her husband a mensa et thoro, without the aid of a court
of chancery') or she could forbid the use of any article of furniture,-which the legislature could not have intended. It is simply impossible that a woman married should
be able to control and enjoy her property as if she were sole, without leaving her at
liberty, practically, to annul the marriage tie at pleasure; and the same is true of the
property of the husband, so far as it is directly connected with the nurture and maintenance of his household. The statute [1861] cannot receive a literal interpretation."
But see Parent v. Callerand, 64 Ill. 97 (1872) where it was held that a married woman
can lease her realty for the duration of coverture without her husband's joining in the
lease.
74. In some states the tenancy by the entirety has been unaffected by the married
women's property statutes since such a well-established device at common law is not
abrogated by implication; in some states it has been held to be abrogated;
and in some states it remains with some incidents changed by implication. See
MCCURDY, DoMESTIc RELATIONS 554-558 (4th ed. 1952). Where permitted it has often
been characterized as "anomalous," i.e., inconsistent with the supplanting of the unity
concept with the separate concept. See Bloomfield v. Brown, 67 R.I. 452, 25 A.2d 354,
141 A.L.R. 170 (1942) ; Arrand v. Graham, 297 Mich. 559, 298 N.W. 281, 136 AL.R.
1206 (1941); Rapacz, Progress of the Property Law Relating to Married Women,
11 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 173 (1942-43).
75. ALA. CoDE ANN. tit. 34, § 72 (Supp. 1951) ; ARK. STAr. ANN. § 55-401 (Supp.
1955); CAL. CIv. PRAC. CODE ANN. § 370 (West Supp. 1956); COLO. REv. STAT.
§§90-21, 22 (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7307 (1949); FLA. STAT. § 62.39 (1955);
GA. CODE ANN. § 53-507 (Supp. 1955) ; IDAHO CODE § 5-304 (Supp. 1955) ; KAN. GEN.
STAT. 60-404 (1949) ; Ky. REV. STAT. § 404.060 (1953) ; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:102
(West Supp. 1955) ; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. c. 166, §§35, 38 (1954) ; MD. ANN. CODE
art. 45, §5 (Supp. 1956); MICH, STAT. ANN. § 27.657; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 519.01
(Supp. 1956); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 415.250 (Supp. 1956); MONT. REv. CODES ANN.
§ 36-110 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-305 (Supp. 1955); N.H. REV. STAT. §460:2
(Supp. 1955); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-6-6 (Supp. 1955); N.D. REV. CODE § 14.0705
(Supp. 1953); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.09 (Page Supp. 1956) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, §224 (Supp. 1956); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. c. 417, § 14 (1938) (see PUBLIC
LAWS C. 1397 [1944]) ; S.D. CODE § 14.0207 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-601 (Supp.
1956); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-2-2 (Supp. 1955); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-36 (Supp.
1956); W. VA. CODE ANN. §4750 (1955); Wyo. COMp. STAT. ANN. §3-604 (1945).
See also TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1983 (Supp. 1956).
76. ARIZ. CODE ANN. §25-501 (1939) ; see also 16 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN., Rules
of Civ. Pro. 17(e).
77. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-205 (Supp. 1955) (semble wife may sue husband as to
property only) ; MIss. ConE ANN. § 452 (Supp. 1956) ; NEv. COMP. LAWS § 8546
(Supp. 1949) (wife may sue husband) ; N.Y. Doi. REL. LAW § 57; N.C. GEN. STAT.
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expressly excluded 78 or restricted to suits by the wife 79 or to suits in
equity. The Massachusetts statute " gives a married woman capacity
to sue and to be sued "in the same manner as if she were sole; but this
section shall not authorize suits between husband and wife." The
New Jersey statute is similar."' In Oklahoma, 2 household furniture
and dwelling are exempt from property actions between spouses and
reserved for division upon dissolution of the home.'
Oregon expressly provides that should either spouse obtain possession or
control of property of the other the owner may maintain an action
as if unmarried."
In Massachusetts, although the position of the married woman
in respect to persons other than her husband is in the matter of civil
action the same as an unmarried woman (that is, she may sue either
at law or in equity as appropriate to the interests to be protected), the
position of the spouses inter se is different. The statutory provision
does not "authorize suits between husband and wife." This has been
construed to mean that such actions as were permitted before the
statute are still permitted, in other words suits in equity. Although
the property interest may in a particular case now be legal its protection against the spouse is in equity, in the same manner as if the
interest in question had been equitable prior to the statute. If a
husband wrongfully sells his wife's chattel to a third person, the wife
would have a legal action against the third person, but only a bill in
equity against the husband, and under the Massachusetts equitable
separate estate doctrine this is confined to specific relief. This construction also applies to actions by a husband. 5
§ 52-10.1

(Supp. 1955); PA. SWAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 111 (1930) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
28, § 320 (1930) (wife may sue husband to protect and recover property), Bodner
v. Herly, 47 Bucks 31 (Pa. 1954), Candidi v. Candidi, 87 D. & C. 96 (Pa. 1954)
WIs. STAT. § 246.075 (Supp. 1956). See also IDAHO CODE § 5-304 (Supp. 1955)
S.C. CODE § 10-216 (Supp. 1956) ;WASH. REv. CODE §§26.16.150, 26.16.120, 26.16.160,
26.16.180 (Supp. 1956).
78. FLA. STAT. § 708.03 (1955) (except management of wife's property).
79. See note 77 supra.
80. MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 209, § 6 (Supp. 1956).
81. N.J. REv. STAT. § 37:2-5 (Supp. 1956). See Bendler v. Bendler, 3 N.J. 161, 69
A.2d 302 (1949).
82. OKI-A. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1278, 1284 (Supp. 1956).
83. Held in Bruner v. Hart, 178 Okla. 22, 62 P.2d 513 (1936) to withdraw such
property from the general law.
84. ORE. REv. STAT. 108.080 (1955). See also IOWA CODE ANN. § 597.3 (Supp.
1956).
85. Gibbons v. Gibbons, 296 Mass. 89, 4 N.E.2d 1019 (1936) ; Giles v. Giles, 279
Mass. 284, 181 N.E. 176 (1932); Young v. Young, 251 Mass. 218, 146 N.E. 574
(1925) ; Ricker v. Ricker, 248 Mass. 549, 143 N.E.. 539 (1924) ; Bovarnick v. Davis,
235 Mass. 195, 126 N.E. 380 (1920). Cf. Ago v. Canner, 167 Mass. 390, 45 N.E. 754
(1897).
See also Ramsey v. Ramsey, Mass. A.S. 189 (1957).
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Under the comprehensive Connecticut Married Women's Statute
of 1877 86 it was reasoned that the foundation of the legal status
of the husband and wife, namely, unity, was removed ".

.

and a

new foundation, namely, equality of husband and wife in legal identity
and capacity of owning property, was laid.

."

Although the

equitable status was taken as a model, legal rights and remedies
necessarily followed although not expressly provided. A wife may
sue her husband at law. ".

.

.

an Act which changes the foundation

of the status necessarily involves the consequences of the new status
and not those of the old, and these consequences cannot be prohibited
by inference unless the inference of prohibition is necessary." 87
Unless the provisions of the statute preclude it, it has usually
been held that (apart from the question of the matrimonial home) the
wife may maintain property actions and suits against the husband just
as she may against one not her husband.8" Courts that deny personal
tort actions89 as well as courts that allow them " usually agree that
actions may be maintained between the spouses to recover property and
redress torts thereto, the latter often using the property situation as
refuting the argument of disturbance of domestic tranquility, or peace
and harmony of the home, as a reason against actions for injuries to
the person.
The matter of the matrimonial home may, however, present more
troublesome problems.
When the parties are residing in accord 91 in the house owned by
one or the other, no property "wrongs" have occurred. The non86. CONN. PUB. AcTs 211 (1877).
87. Mathewson v. Mathewson, 79 Conn. 23, 63 Atl. 285, 5 L.R.A. (n.s.) 611, 6
Ann. Cas. 1027 (1906).
88. Berdell v. Parkhurst, 58 How. Pr. 102 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Gen. T. 1879) (action
by husband for conversion) ; Hamilton v. Hamilton, 225 Ala. 284, 51 So.2d 13 (1950)
(trover) ; Eddleman v. Eddleman, 183 Ga. 766, 189 S.E. 833 (1937) (husband may
maintain trover) ; Smith v. Smith, 20 R.I. 566, 40 Atl. 417 (1898) (trover for household furniture); Bruce v. Bruce, 9 Ala. 563, 11 So. 197 (1891) (detinue) ; Walker
v. Walker, 215 Ky. 154, 284 S.W. 1042 (1926) (wife had right of landlord where
husband is tenant); Cook v. Cook, 125 Ala. 583, 27 So. 918 (1899) (recovery of
realty); Craft v. American Agricultural Chemical Co., 81 Fla. 55, 87 So. 51 (1921)
(wife may oust husband) ; Markham v. Markham, 4 Mich. 305 (1856) (at law or in
equity) ; Peters v. Peters, 20 Del. Ch. 28, 169 A.2d 298 (1933) ; Masterman v. Masterman, 129 Md. 167, 98 Atl. 537 (1916) (in equity) ; Freitag v, Bersano, 123 N.J.Eq.
515, 198 Atl. 845 (1938); Hedlund v. Hedlund, 87 Colo. 607, 290 Pac. 285 (1930)
(bill by husband for accounting).
89. See Hunter v. Livingston, 125 Ind. App. 422, 123 N.E.2d 912 (1955). See
also Smith v. Smith, 61 Ore. Ad. 3, 287 P.2d 572 (1955).
90. Franklin v. Wills, 217 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1954) ; Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d
480, 43 A.L.R.2d 626 (Ky. 1953); Damm v. Elyria Lodge, 158 Ohio St. 107, 107
N.E.2d 337 (1952).
91. "When husband and wife live together in amity (a situation which is perhaps
more often brought to the notice of social scientists than to that of lawyers in the
course of their professional activities) what predominates is the unity of the household . . ." 0. Kahn-Freund, Inconsistencies and Injustices in the Law of Husband

and Wife, 15 MoD. L. Rrv. 133, 135-136 (1952).
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owner is not a tenant and is not in possession.
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The presence of the

one is not adverse to the other, and it may be said that each has an equal
right to occupation and use, due to permission of the owner express
or implied.'
Where disagreement occurs for whatever reason, the situation
changes. The owner may have matrimonially deserted, leaving the
other in fact in the house; or the non-owner may have forced the other
out; or the owner may have left with matrimonial justification; or the
owner may simply wish to terminate his or her permission and use the
property for other purposes. Not only are questions of right involved
but perhaps more troublesome, if there is the right, are questions of
procedure: are technical elements necessary for ejectment present, is
resort to equity the way to oust, is there some available summary
proceeding, or are all such suits between husband and wife against
judicial public policy in spite of changes enacted by the statutes?
In Minier v. Minier it appeared that a husband occupied a
house, purchased for his wife as a home, and refused to permit her to
participate in the occupancy. The married women's statute contained
no express provisions concerning suits by a wife against her husband.
It was held that an action in the nature of ejectment would lie, inasmuch as the wife, since the statute, had legal title, and the proper
action was at law. The court reasoned that before the statute a suit
in equity might have been brought, and there is no new opportunity
for litigation, since policy "already allows and provides for suits in
regard to property between husband and wife; and is fraught with
no such disastrous consequences to domestic peace and concord [as
would action for slander or assault]." As to property "the parties
are strangers to each other." 15
In Edmonds v. Edmonds 96 it appeared that the wife owned a
house which was a gift from the husband and occupied by them as a
92. Graham v. Graham, 202 Ala. 56, 79 So. 450 (1918) ; Cipperly v. Cipperly, 104
Misc. 434, 172 N.Y.S. 351 (County Ct. 1918).
93. Wehoffer v. Wehoffer, 176 Ore. 345, 156 P.2d 830 (1945); Note, 18 ROCKY
MT. L. REv. 406 (1945-46)
(implied consent to use without compensation although
part of the wife's premises occupied as the home was used by the husband for business purposes).
94. 4 Lans. 421 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 1870).
95. In Wood v. Wood, 83 N.Y. 575 (1881) premises were conveyed to a wife
(not by her husband) for life, for her sole and separate use, and it was occupied as
the matrimonial home. By reason of the husband's conduct the wife left. It was held
that the husband does not become a tenant by will or sufferance holding over, but is
more like a trespasser; if the wife has been ousted she may have ejectment even though
her husband is the one who ousted her. Against the argument of the husband that it
was the intention of the grantor that the land be held jointly as a homestead, the
court concluded that the purpose was the contrary, "to shut out the husband from any
legal or equitable interest," and that by virtue of her title the wife had sole and absolute possession.
96. 139 Va. 652, 124 S.E. 415 (1924).
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home, and that the wife had deserted the husband. Her action was
of unlawful detainer to recover possession of a room in the house
which the husband continued to occupy. It also appeared that the
husband was anxious for his wife to return. It was held that the
wife could maintain her action irrespective of the husband's right to
curtesy and his "marital rights,""7 and that the wife's desertion does
not entitle the husband to occupy her lands against her will, since her
rights are determined by the married women's statute and not by his
"marital rights": "It follows that a husband in Virginia may be a
trespasser upon his wife's land whenever she is not occupying them,
if he goes there against her will or her commands * *

."

The court

also said that the husband occupies the position of a guest upon his
wife's property: 98 "His rights are determined by the statute, 'and not
by the fact as to whether the relations between husband and. wife are
friendly or unfriendly, whether they are living together or apart, or
whether they separated for good cause or no cause at all." The court
remarked, however, that were the statute not express," as in Virginia
(then section 5134) : "On grounds of public policy the inference could
very well be drawn in cases where the wife's property had been set aside
as a joint or family home with her consent, that she could not desert
it without cause, and then taking advantage of her own wrong, turn
her husband out."

100

In Kelley v. Kelley,' actions of trespass and ejectment by a wife
against her husband, it appeared that the wife had bought with a
legacy a two-tenement house in which she and her. husband had
97. By VA. CODE ANN. § 55-35 (1950) the wife has a right to acquire any property and dispose of it as if unmarried, provided that the husband is entitled to curtesy, ". . . but neither [her husband's] right to curtesy nor his marital rights shall
entitle him to the possession or use, or to the rents, issues and profits of [his wife's]
real estate during the coverture." The wife may sue and be sued as if unmarried.
98. Citing King v. Davis, 137 Fed. 222 (C.C.W.D. Va. 1905).
..
99. The provisions of the Virginia Code referred to in the case would seem to
state in express words concerning the husband's lus mariti what would be necessarily
implied in other statutes giving the wife use powers over her real estate.
100. Citing Manning v. Manning, 79 N.C. 293, 28 Am. Rep. 324 (1878); State
v. Jones, 132 N.C. 1043, 43 S.E. 939, 61 L.R.A. 777, 95 Am. St. Rep. 688 (1903). See
however the following cases which the court cited in support of the wife's rights: Cook
v. Cook, 125 Ala. 583, 27 So. 918, 82 Am' St. Rep. 264 (1900) ; Crater v. Crater, 118
Ind. 521, 21 N.E. 290, 10 Am. St. Rep. 161 (1889); Buckingham v. Buckingham, 81
Mich. 89, 45 N.W. 504 (1890); McDuff v. McDuff, 45 Cal. App. 53, 187 Pac. 37
(1920) ; Minier v. Minier, 4 Lans. 421 (N.Y. Sup.' Ct. Gen. T. 1870).
-In Humphreys v. Strong, 141 Va. 146, 126 S.E. 194 (1925) pursuant to an antenuptial agreement the husband had conveyed a house to his wife and it was occupied
by them as a marital residence. Due to alleged cruelty of the husband-the wife left
him and obtained a divorce. Thereafter she brought ejectment; the husband sued her
to enjoin her action and to cancel the deed. It was held for the wife. The court reasoned that the result would have been the same had there been no divorce, since the
"jus mariti" in the property no longer existed under the married women's act. "As to
her property rights during coverture they are as strangers." The court does not commit itself as to what would have been the result if the wife had been guilty of desertion.
101. 51 R.I. 173, 153 Atl. 314, 74-A.L.R. 135 (1931).
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already been living for some five years, and that after the purchase
they had continued residing there for some thirteen years. During
this time they had joined in a mortgage conveyance, and the husband
had paid the mortgage interest, part of the repairs, insurance premiums,
taxes, and water bills. The wife became dissatisfied with the location, and the husband refusing to move, moved elsewhere and rented
out the upper tenement to a third person. After an interval she demanded rent from her husband for the lower tenement in part of
which he maintained his office as a physician. Upon his refusal to pay
rent the wife's actions were brought. The Rhode Island statute 102
provided that property of a woman before marriage or property that
may become hers after marriage shall remain her sole and separate
property free from control of her husband, and in all actions at law or
in equity by or against a married woman she shall sue and be sued
alone. The court had previously held that a wife could maintain an
action against her husband for conversion of her personal property,'l 3
but not for personal injuries. 4 It was held, affirming a judgment
below, that the actions of trespass and ejectment would not lie, the
court saying: ". . . Marriage contemplates the living together of the
husband and the wife. The law favors the marital relation and the
permanence of the family. The voluntary separation without consent
and without justification of one spouse from the other is a legal
desertion which if continued is a ground for divorce. The relief sought
in the case at bar consists not only of putting the wife in possession
but in expelling the husband from his wife's home which is the lawful
home of both husband and wife. The occupancy of the husband is not
adverse to the title of his wife and is not however long continued a
basis for acquiring title by possession.

.

.

.

The wife still has the

legal possession and also the right of occupancy if she wishes to exercise
it. Neither husband nor wife without lawful cause so long as the
marital relation exists can exclude the other from the home they have
established by mutual and voluntary choice." 10
These reasons are vulnerable in respect to concepts both of ownership and of conjugal duties. As a preliminary matter it should be
observed that the payment of mortgage interest, insurance premiums,
102. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. c. 417 (1938).
103. Smith v. Smith, 20 R.I. 556, 40 Atd. 417 (1898).
104. Oken v. Oken, 44 R.I. 291, 117 Atl. 357 (1922).
105. Cf. McDuff v. McDuff, 45 Cal. App. 53, 187 Pac. 37 (1920). The home had
been conveyed to a wife by her husband as her separate property. Having left him,
she sued for separate maintenance. Judgment was for the husband. In an action by
her in the nature of ejectment the husband's contention that neither spouse could be
excluded from the dwelling under sections 156 and 157 of the Civil Code was rejected: "At the time of the commencement of this action the house was not the family
dwelling place . . . the husband was holding possession of the wife's separate property adversely to her as owner."
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taxes, and water bills as such gives the husband no property interest,
since these things would seem referable to support, and moreover would
be presumed gratuitous."° The house therefore remains the wife's
property. A refusal of a wife to have her own house used as the family
dwelling is not desertion so long as she is willing to live with her
husband in another house of his choice provided by him."0 7 The
reference to the husband's occupancy not being adverse to the wife's
title seems to refer to technical requirements for ejectment, which
would not be met so long as he was residing there by the wife's permission, for under those circumstances the husband is not in possession.
But after the wife terminates her permission, an occupier, if he were
not the husband, would be subject to ejectment or some equivalent
ouster proceeding, and if the husband is not so subject it is only
because he is the husband, and this reasoning therefore would seem
to assume the result rather than furnish a basis for it.' 0 8 The proposition that "mutual and voluntary choice" in respect to use of the individually owned matrimonial home is irrevocable during coverture in
absence of lawful cause seems to equate the ownership power of
revocation with the laws of separation and divorce. The fact that the
wife has "the right of occupancy if she wishes to exercise it" and that
the husband cannot lawfully exclude her does not give her the exclusive
occupancy which as owner the statute seems to recognize.
What therefore would be a wife's remedy, if any? Does the
case decide only that an action at law (trespass, ejectment) is not
available?

109

Is a bill in equity

o or some other proceeding pos-

106. McAllister v. McAllister, 342 Ill. 231, 173 N.E. 745, 74 A.L.R. 213 (1930).
107. A husband financially able cannot require his wife to live in his mother's
home, despite her agreement with him before marriage to do so. Horkheimer v. Horkheimer, 106 W. Va. 634, 146 S.E. 614 (1929). Cf. Flynn v. Flynn, 272 Mich. 291, 261
N.W. 329 (1935). See also McCuRDY, DoMESTIc RELATIONS 347 (4th ed. 1952).
The husband's right to fix the domicile is no longer absolute. See Franklin v.
Franklin, 190 Mass. 349, 77 N.E. 48, 4 L.R.A. (n.s.) 145, 5 Ann. Cas. 851 (1906)
("It should be exercised with some reference to the welfare of the wife."). See also
McCuRDY, DoMleSTIc RELATIONs 349 (4th ed. 1952).

There seems no good reason why he should have the right to fix irrevocably the
domicile in his wife's separately owned house, even though she once consented to its
use as the matrimonial home. See Copeman v. Copeman, sup-ra note 64.
108. See Cipperly v. Cipperly, 104 Misc. 434, 172 N.Y.S. 351 (County Ct. 1918).
109. Cf. Cipperly v. Cipperly, supra, where it was held that after a wife revoked
permission to occupy her premises where she and her husband had been residing (apparently because she wished to use her property differently, for an estrangement was not
mentioned), the husband was not an intruder or squatter under section 2232 of the
Code of Civil Procedure to be ousted by summary proceedings: "These rights [the
husband's jus mariti] have been taken away by statute, but the marital relation remains ....
If there is to be a separation between the parties, the law provides a way
to accomplish it. The way provided is not by this proceeding." No reference was made
to Minier v. Minier, 4 Lans. 421 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 1870). Did the court mean
that only summary proceedings were not available or that the only legal solution would
be a marital separation?
110. See Plotkin v. Plotkin, 32 Del. (2 W.W. Harr.) 455, 125 At. 455 (Super.
Ct. 1924), 19 ILL. L. RE"v. 371 (1925), where the action was by the husband against
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sible? ... The reasoning of the Kelley case would seem to exclude

equitable relief as well as an action at law. May a wife sell or lease her
house and let the purchaser or lessee force the husband out? In some
states a valid conveyance may still require the joinder of a husband with
his wife as grantor 112 (apart from reasons of curtesy or possible homestead). But even if a wife is permitted to convey by her sole deed,
the result would be analogous to a forced sale and might depress the
price any purchaser with reason to know that a sale is the only way
a wife can get her husband out would likely be willing to pay. And a
buyer or lessee might be deterred from buying an ouster suit, but if he
were not, and if he should buy or lease, would not his ouster of the
husband disturb family permanence just as much? These results would
not seem to accord with a statute's provision that the wife's property
"shall be free from control of her husband."
The reasoning of the Kelley case seems vulnerable also in respect
to public policy. If remedy by civil action is not available and if sale
or lease is impossible or undesirable and the matter is of sufficient
importance or fancied importance to the parties and there are no
grounds for divorce against the husband, the result would seem to be
an impasse. This in turn may lead to a maritally disruptive situation
(although the disagreement may not have previously reached that
point), and could lead to permanent separation or perhaps end in
divorce, particularly if a wife, persisting in her property attitude would
be considered a deserter. Would denial of property suits therefore
be effective implementation of the policy that "the law favors the
marital relation and the permanence of the family" ?
The domestic tranquillity objection to a civil action involves a
fallacy in that it assumes that such domestic disharmony would ensue
his wife to recover possession of personal property. The statute secured the wife's
separate property and gave general power to her to sue and be sued, but contained no
express provision as to suing her husband. Holding that the statute must be strictly
construed as in derogation of the common law, the court held that the action would
not lie, saying: ".

.

. but the right to sue each other strikes at the very heart of do-

mestic relations and its effect not only upon the home ties, but upon society generally
would be far reaching. For these reasons the husband and wife should not be permitted
to sue each other in a court of law unless the right is expressly granted to them by the
statute under which it is claimed." Does the reference to "law" include "equity"?
111. See Kashner v. Kapilow, 283 App. Div. 929, 130 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1st Dep't
1954), aff'd, 308 N.Y. 887, 125 N.E.2d 565 (1955) where it appeared that while the
wife was occupying premises under provisions of a separation decree the husband sold

the premises and thereafter continued to pay rent to the purchaser. It was held, one
justice in the Appellate Division dissenting, that the purchaser took subject to the
wife's rights under the separation decree, and was not entitled to proceed as landlord
against the wife in statutory hold-over proceedings but without prejudice to another
proceeding or action, if any, which he might be entitled to maintain.
112. See In re Haines' Trust Estate, 356 Pa. 10, 50 A.2d 692 (1947), 51 Dicx. L.
Riv. 281; Cole v. Van Riper, 44 Ill.
58 (1867) ; White v. Wager, 25 N.Y. 328 (1862).
See also MCCURDY, DoMEsTIc RLA'TIONs 584 (4th ed. 1952).
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from an action or its possibility as would threaten or cause marital
disruption. If tranquillity had not already been thus seriously disturbed it is not likely that a civil action will do so. Nor is it likely
that the possibility of an action being permitted will do so, or its
impossibility prevent. There is no reason to suppose that allowing
actions causes discord more than would denying them. For the denial
of a forum may accentuate friction. The causes of any such friction
lie not in the possibility of civil action, but in changes in the concepts
of and in the attitudes toward the position and capacities of the
married woman and in the pragmatically emotional reaction thereto
of individuals.
If marital disruption has already occurred there would seem
to be no convincing reason based upon preservation of tranquillity
to deny a property action. If it has occurred the question should be
one of support and maintenance, and, regardless of which party is at
fault, not one of the right to use or occupy the other's specific property.
If it should be necessary to make orders in reference to property
ancillary to support it should be done in maintenance or divorce proceedings1 2 a
In Hall v. Hall " it appeared that a husband and wife having
separated, and the wife having sought unsuccessfully to obtain a
divorce decree, she brought an action against her husband for unlawful
detainer of her real estate although it had been used as their home.
A judgment overruling the husband's plea in abatement was affirmed,
the court saying, citing Kelley v. Kelley: 114 " .
we think the
question [whether her right to possession gives her the right to oust
her husband and treat him as a trespasser] 'is one of fact to be determined in each particular case."
The wife not being entitled to a divorce, what is the question
of "fact to be determined"? And is the question to be left to a discretion which Would include a general discretion to consider marital
fault? If so, the opinion of the Massachusetts court," 5 where the
question concerned the discretion of trial judges to consider conduct
short of recrimination as a bar to divorce, seems pertinent: "In respect to divorce wide cleavages of opinion exist. . . The divorce
law has to be administered by judges whose personal opinions vary
112 a. Ramsey v. Ramsey, Mass. A.S. 189 (1957).
113. 193 Tenn. 74, 241 S.W.2d 919 (1951).
114. 51 R.I. 173, 153 Atl. 314 (1931). The court had previously cited Cook v.
Cook, 125 Ala. 583, 27 So. 918 (1900) as entirely in point, and Buckingham v. Buckingham, 81 Mich. 89, 45 N.W. 504 (1890) as in accord.
115. Reddington v. Reddington, 317 Mass. 760, 59 N.E.2d 775, 159 A.L.R. 1448

(1945).
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. If every judge .

were entitled to exercise discretion according to his own ideas of
propriety or of public policy, the judicial branch of government .
would become a government of men and not of laws." Relevant factors can be established and the scope of judicial discretion delineated
by appellate decisions but the process could well be an empirical one,
expensive in time and money to many private litigants (and might contribute to broken marriages).
Whether civil sanctioning of dissolution divorce (for causes arising during marriage) resulted in, or contributed to, the enactment
of ever broader married women's statutes," 0 or whether the latter
have influenced the enactment and later extensions of divorce statutes
and have made legally possible a mode of marital life in respect to
property matters that is promotive of frictions leading to disruption .
are questions that probably cannot be definitely answered."" It would
seem that both developments rest upon a common attitude of civil
society, and that it is probable that each has had a not unimportant
impact upon the other.
While no necessarily irreconcilable conflict should be involved
between property rights and conjugal rights, if it is to be thought that
there is such a conflict inherent in the concept of separate ownership of
the home or that a substantial social problem exists, consideration
should be given to specific legislation, which might take the form Of a
116. Dissolution divorce by general law was provided for in England by the
Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, 20 & 21 VICT. c. 85, slightly expanded by the Act of
1923, 13 & 14 GEo. 5, c. 19, and much expanded by the Act of 1937, 1 EDw. 8 & 1 GEO.
6, c. 57. It was provided for in some of the United States earlier. See McCurdy, Divorce
-A Suggested Approach with ParticularReference to Dissolution for Living Separate
and Apart, 9 VAND. L. REv. 685 (1956).
117. Not only do the married women's property acts proceed on the philosophy of
separate property ownership, but the common-law dower and curtesy have been
widely abolished, and in many states the tenancy by the entirety is unavailable. In
many states a married person has power to convey his or her property without joinder
of the other spouse; and in many states a married woman is entitled to her services
and earnings without legal necessity of her husband's consent.
Consider the matter of services and earnings when consent of the husband to his
wife's performing work for others outside the home is not required by the statute for
the wife to be entitled to such earnings, although he is still, despite the statute, entitled in law to domestic or household services. In Harmon v. Old Colony
R.R., 165 Mass. 100, 42 N.E. 505, 30 L.R.A. 658 (1896) it was said: "Her right to
employ her time for the earnings of money on her own account is as complete as his.
• . . This may interfere with his right to and enjoyment of her society and services.
But this is a consequence which the Legislature must be deemed to have foreseen and
intended. . . . So far as the statutes have given to her a right to act independently of
him, so far his rights and control in respect to her are necessarily abridged. . . . It is
urged in argument that she may contract to devote her whole time to work which is to
be performed away from his home, this amounting to a desertion. . . . But the possibility of extreme cases should not conclusively determine the construction of statutes,
nor do we now decide whether the statutes would permit such action on her part against
his consent."
118. See note 63 supra.
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statutory marital estate in real estate used in fact as the home, which
should seek to avoid delegating undefined discretion, to afford more
clearly defined rights in the property of either spouse so used, to protect
and encourage joint occupancy rather than to permit ouster of one
by the other, and perhaps give the parties better protection against
third persons than the law may now afford.
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